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THE APPLICATION OF THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS
OF TEXAS TO LABOR UNIONS
"Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a
free government, and shall never be allowed, . . ."
T HIS declaration appeared in the first organic law of Texas
and remains in force to the present day, indicating a basic
public policy of the State to forbid any combination or act tend-
ing to restrain the free course of trade and commerce. Supple-
mentary to the Constitution and in much greater detail, legislation
has been enacted at various times for the purpose of achieving
and maintaining freedom of trade and commerce.2 The statutes
ITx. CONST. Art. I, § 26.
2 Tax. R v. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) Arts. 7426-7447.
Art. 742 defines a trust as a "combination of ... acts by two or more persons,... or
associations of persons... for either or all of the following purposes: 1. To create, or
which my tend to create, or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce ... or carry out
restrictions in the free pursuit of any business authorized or permitted by laws of this
state. 2. To fix, maintain, increase, or reduce the price of merchandise. 3. To prevent or
lessen competition. 4. To fix or maintain any standard or figure whereby the price of any
article.., shall be in any manner affected, controlled, or established. 5. To make, enter
into, maintain, execute, or carry out any contract.. . not to sell ... any article or com-
modity... or by which they shall in any manner affect or maintain the price of any
commodity or article ... to preclude a free and unrestricted competition... or by which
they shall agree to pool, combine or unite any interest they may have in ... any article
or commodity .. whereby its price... might in any manner be affected. 6. To regulate,
fix, or limit the output of any article or commodity... or the amount of work that may
be done.... 7. To abstain from engaging in or continuing in business ... partially or
entirely within the State of Texas..."
Art. 7428 enacts: "Either or any of the following acts shall constitute a conspiracy in
restraint of trade: 1. Where any two or more persons.. engaged in buying or selling any
article of merchandise ... enter into an agreement ... to refuse to buy from or sell to
any person ... any article of merchandise... 2. Where two or more persons ... shall
agree to boycott or threaten to refuse to buy from or sell to any person ... for buying
from or selling to any other person. 3. Where any two or more persons, . .. or associa-
tions of persons shall agree to boycott, or enter into any agreement or understanding to
refuse to transport, deliver, receive, accept, erect, assemble, operate, use, or work with
any goods, wares, merchandise, articles or products of any other person, firm, corporation
or association of persons; provided, however, that this subdivision of this article shall
not be construed to apply to an agreement between employees to terminate their employ-
ment, or to refuse to transport, deliver, receive, erect, assemble, operate, use or work
with the goods, wares, merchandise, articles or products of their immediate employer
unles& such refusal is intended or calculated to induce, or shall have the effect of induc-
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define trusts, monopolies, and conspiracies in restraint of trade,
and provide that "Any and all trusts . .. and conspiracies in
restraint of trade . . . are prohibited and declared to be illegal."'
These legislative declarations are no more than a codification
of our inheritance from the common law of England. An apt
illustration of the attitude of the common law toward monopolies
is to be found in the well-known Case of Monopolies.' This de-
cision reveals the basic social objection to monopoly and espouses
the philosophy of freedom of commercial intercourse. The hold-
ing of the case was that a certain exclusive manufacturing fran-
ing, such employer from purchasing or from otherwise acquiring goods, wares, merchan-
dise, articles or products from any person, firm. corporation, or association of persons."
(Sec. 3 was added by amendment on May 30, 1947, to be effective 90 days after June 6,
1947).
Article 7429 enacts that "any and all trusts... and conspiracies in restraint of trade,
as herein defined, are prohibited and declared to be illegal."
Tex. Pen. Code (Vernon, 1925) Arts. 1632-1634 are also applicable. Art. 1632 is
exactly the same as Tax. Rav. Ctv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 7426, and Art. 1633 is
exactly the same as Tax. REv. Ctv. STAT. (Vernon. 1925) Art. 7428, including tile latest
amendment.
Art. 1637 enacts that if any person shall form or agree to form a trust or conspiracy
in restraint of trade, or be a party thereto, or act in furtherance thereof, he shall be
confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than ten years.
Art. 1643 provides: "It shall be lawful for any members of such trades unions or
other organization or association, or any other person, to induce or attempt to induce,
by peaceable and lawful means, any person to accept any particular employment, or quit
any particular employment in which such person may then be engaged, or to enter any
pursuit, or refuse to enter any pursuit, or quite any pursuit, in which such person shall
then be engaged. No such member shall have the right to trespass upon the premises of
another without the consent of the owner thereof."
Art. 1644, as amended on May 30, 1947, provides: "The foregoing article (1643) shall
not be held to apply to any combination or combinations, or to any act by any member of
such trades union or other organization or association, or any other person, or to an
agreement between two or more persons, formed or taken for the purpose of limiting the
production, transportation, use or consumption of labors' products, or which creates a
'Trust' or 'Conspiracy in Restraint of Trade' as in this chapter defined. Nothing herein
contained shall be held to interfere with the terms and conditions of private contract
with regard to time of service, or other stipulation, between employers and employees.
Nothing herein contained shall be construed to repeal, affect, or diminish the force and
effect of any statute now existing on the subject of trusts, conspiracies against trade,
pools, or monopolies."
Tax. Rav. CI. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) Arts. 5152-5154 are also applicable. Art. 5152
provides that it shall be lawful for workers to organize into unions to protect their
interests.
Art. 5153 is substantially the same as Tm. PEN. CODE (Vernon, 1925) Art. 1643.
Art. 5154 is substantially the same as TEx. PEN CODE (Vernon, 1925) Art. 1644.
3 TEx. Ray. Cry. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 7429.
4 Darcy v. Allein, 11 Co. Rep. 84 (1602).
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chise was a monopoly, illegal, and void under the common law.
This early case declared:
"All... trades, as well mechanical as otherwise, which prevent idle-
ness (the bane of the commonwealth) and exercise men and youth in
labour .... are profitable to the commonwealth, and therefore the grant
to the plaintiff to have the sole making of them is against the common
law, and the benefit and liberty of the subject ... there are three insep-
arable incidents to every monopoly.... That... the price of the same
commodity will be raised... that after the monopoly granted, the com-
modity is not so good and merchantable as it was before.... It tends to
the impoverishment of divers artificers and others, who before, by the
labour of their hands in their art or trade, had maintained themselves
and their families, who now will of necessity be constrained to live in
idleness and beggary; ... and the common law, in this point, agrees
with the equity of the law of God .... and it agrees also with the civil
laws; ...
On the basis of the foregoing statement one might think that
any type of monopoly or restraint of trade is prohibited by law.
But this is not so. The question then arises, what restraints are
permissible? Or, to narrow the question for purposes of this study,
to what extent are labor union activities subject to the anti-trust
laws of Texas? Conflicting constructions of the Texas statutes
have caused uncertainty with respect to this issue. It is thought
desirable to examine the cases to determine whether or not a
definite answer can be given as to the application of the anti-
trust laws to unions.
On March 30, 1889, the Texas Legislature passed "an act to
define trusts, and to provide for penalties . . . and to promote
free competition in the State of Texas."" This act defined a trust
in substantially the same manner as does the present statute
and declared that a violation of any of the provisions of the act
was a restraint of trade. The first case arising under this statute,
Queen Insurance Co. v. State," was a suit brought by the state to
restrain a combination of fire insurance companies from fixing
5 Id. at 86.
6 Tex. Laws 1889, c. 117, p. 141.
786 Tex. 250, 24 S. W. 397 (1893).
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rates and agents' commissions. The Supreme Court of Texas held
the act to be constitutional, but not applicable to the insurance
business. The word "trade" was not to be construed as including
every type of contract, and the insurance business was not within
scope of the act. In Anheuser-Busch Brewing Association v.
Houck' the court again held the act constitutional; it intimated
that if a contract were found to be in restraint of trade under the
statute, no distinction would be made as to whether the restraint
were reasonable or unreasonable.
In 1895 the act was amended in order that it should not be con-
strued to prevent laborers from organizing for the purpose of
maintaining standards of wages. In Texas Brewing Co. v. Ander-
son9 and in Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State1 the amended act was
held a constitutional exercise of the State's police power and not
violative of the Federal Constitution.
The Anti-Trust Act was again amended in 1899.1' Shortly
thereafter, the Legislature enacted what has since become Arts.
1642-1644 of the Penal Code,'12 which declared it lawful for labor
to organize and for union members to induce, by peaceful means,
others to stop or start any particular work. A provision was also
inserted that these sections should not be held to apply to any
combination the purpose of which was to limit the production or
consumption of labor's products an,] that nothing therein should
be construed to repeal, affect, or diminish the anti-trust statutes.'"
8 88 Tex. 184, 30 S. W. 869 (1895).
9 40 S. W. 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897).
10 19 Tex. Civ. App. 1, 44 S. W. 936 (1898).
11 Tex. Laws 1899, c. 146, p. 246.
12 Tex. Laws 1899, c. 153, p. 162.
Is In 1903 the Legislature enacted a new anti-trust act (Tex. Laws 1903, c. 94, p. 119)
expressly repealing all former enactments on the subject, and in 1911 the statutes of the
state were codified for the first time. By 1923 the Legislature amended the 1903 act (Tex.
Laws 1923, c. 5, p. 12), and in 1925 the statutes were revised again, taking their present
numbers. For various cases construing the constitutionality and applicability of the anti-
trust statutes through these modifications, see the following: Queen Insurance Co. v.
State, 86 Tex. 250,24 S. W. 397 (1893) ; Anheuser-Busch Brewing Co. v. Hauck. 88 Tex.
184, 30 S. W. 869 (1895) ; Texas Brewing Co. v. Anderson, 40 S. W. 737 (Tex. Civ. App.
1897) ; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 1, 44 S. W. 936 (1898), 177
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Although the anti-trust statutes have been in effect in this state
since 1889, the first case in which they were applied to labor union
activity did not arise until 1918. In Webb v. Cooks', Waiters' and
Waitresses' Union, No. 74B,1" the plaintiff cafe owner sued to
restrain the defendant union from picketing his place of business
because of his refusal to sign a closed shop contract. No strike
was involved, as the plaintiff did not employ union labor. The
court held that the defendant's activities were not only provoca-
tive of violence and bloodshed, but also amounted to intimida-
tion and coercion. In answer to the defendant's contentions that
an association or combination of persons had the constitutional
right to speak or write free from injunctive restraint and that the
picketing constituted an exercise of such right, the court quoted
at length and with approval the views expressed in American
Federation of Labor v. Buck's Stove and Range Co." In that case
the picketing activities of a labor union had been condemned as
an unlawful boycott. The court there stated:
"... a powerful combination to boycott immediately deflects the
natural course of trade."
It was further said:
"... at common law every person has individually, and the public
also has collectively, a right to require that the course of trade should be
kept free from unreasonable obstruction."
To meet the defendant's argument that its purpose was not to
injure the plaintiff but to promote better conditions, the Texas
court replied that this legitimate purpose became immaterial in
U. S. 28 (1900); Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540 (1902) ; State v.
Waters-Pierce Oil Co., 67 S. W. 1057 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902) ; State ex rel. Attorney-
General v. Shippers Compress and Warehouse Co., 95 Tex. 603, 69 S. W. 58 (1902) ;
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 S. W. 615 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903) ; af'd 197 U. S. 115
(1905) ; State v. Laredo Ice Co., 96 Tex. 461, 73 S. W. 951 (1903) ; Water-Pierce Oil Co.
v. State, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 162, 106 S. W. 918 (1907) ; State v. Humble Oil and Refining
Co., 263 S. W. 319 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) ; State v. Standard Oil Co., 130 Tex. 313, 107
S. W. (2d) 550 (1924); and Ex Parte Tigner, 132 S. W. (2d) 885 (1939), afl'd 310 U. S.
141 (1940).
14 205 S. W. 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
1533 App. D. C. 83 (1918).
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the light of proof that the immediate object was to intimidate and
coerce the plaintiff to sign a contract which he was neither willing
nor obligated to sign. The court rested its decision in part upon
the prohibition of the Texas anti-trust statutes. It was concluded
that the defendant's acts plainly came within the meaning of a
trust, that is, a combination entered into to create and carry out
restrictions in the free pursuit of the plaintiff's lawful business.
Upon the defendant's assertion that Art. 5245,18 declaring the
lawfulness of labor organizations and the use of peaceful means
to induce others to stop or start work, conferred upon it authority
for its actions in relation to the plaintiff's business, the court
pointed out that Art. 5246" provided:
".... nothing herein contained shall be construed to repeal, affect, or
diminish the force and effect of any statute now existing on the subject
of trusts, conspiracies against trade, pools and monopolies."
The court also said that in enacting Art. 5245 the Legislature did
not intend to authorize acts of coercion and intimidation such as
bad been engaged in here.
While a reading of the case makes it apparent that the decision
was not rested entirely upon the anti-trust statutes, it is quite clear
that emphasis was placed upon these enactments. Thus, for the
first time in Texas, a labor organization was held subject to the
anti-trust laws because its actions were an unjustified restriction
upon the free pursuit of a lawful business and fell within one of
the definitions of a "trust." Subsequent decisions have been con-
sistent in asserting the application of the anti-trust laws to labor
activities."
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently spoken
16 Arts. 5245 and 5246 were changed in numbers in the 1925 revision, and are now
5152 and 5154, respectively.
11 In the 1925 revision Art. 5246 became Art. 5154.
18 For cases following the Webb case in applying the anti-trust law to similar fact
situations, see Cooks', Waiters' and Waitresses' Local Union v. Papa George, 230 S. W.
1086 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921): and Culinary Workers' Union No. 331 v. Fuller, 103 S. W.
(2d) 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). See also International Assn. of Machinists Union, Local
No. 1488 v. Federated Assn. of Accessory Workers, 109 S. W. (2d) 303 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937).
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with respect to the application of the Texas anti-trust laws to labor
unions and has indicated some constitutional limitations. The
widely publicized case of Carpenters and Joiners Union of Amer-
ica, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe" was concerned with this
point. Plaintiff's cafe was picketed because he refused to require
a contractor, who was building an entirely separate structure for
him at a distance of a mile and a half from the cafe, to employ
only union labor. The Texas court construed Arts. 5152 and 5153
in such a manner as to authorize labor to organize and to picket
so long as the picketing was carried on by striking employees
having a bona-fide labor dispute with their employer. But the
plaintiff had no such dispute with his employees, and in these
circumstances the court stated:
"No right of free speech ... is transcended by an injunction restrain-
ing the picketing of a place of business by persons (whether members
of a labor organization or union, or not) who seeks either to prevent the
public from trading with the picketed place. or to compel its owner to
break a contract he has with some disassociated third person."' 0
The court called the defendant's attention to the fact that the state
anti-trust laws were in full force and effect. and said that the
Eleventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution did not make
invalid the use of an injunction to prevent violation of these
laws."
Application for a writ of error was denied by the Texas Su-
preme Court, and the United States Supreme Court granted a
writ of certiorari.'- The latter Court affirmed the judgment below
on the ground that a violation of the anti-trust laws could be
found and injunction issued where no "industrial connection"
19 149 S. W. (2d) 694 (Tex- Civ. App. 1941).
20 Id. at 697.
21 Mr. Justice Cody concurred in the refusal of a motion for rehearing, but on the
ground that the right of free speech could not be used to implement a boycott, which he
felt the facts here disclosed. See also Ex Parte Tigner, 139 Tex. Cr. R. 452, 132 S. W.
(2d) 885 (1939), afl'd 310 U. S. 141 (1940).
22 315 U. S. 722 (1942).
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existed between the defendant union and the building contractor.
The Court declared:
"While the right of free speech is embodied in the linerty safeguarded
by the Due Process Clause, that Clause postulates the authority of the
states to translate into law local policies to promote the health, safety,
morals, and general welfare of its people.... The Constitution does not
forbid Texas to draw the line which has been drawn here."12 3
The Ritter case was the last of a series of cases delimiting the
constitutional right of free speech as exercised in peaceful picket-
ing. -4 In view of these cases the Texas decisions prior to 1940 are
of doubtful authority if cited for the broad proposition that an
injunction may issue in any picketing case where a violation of
the anti-trust laws is found. But the Ritter case certainly indi-
cates that violation of anti-trust statutes may be enjoined if the
violation consists in picketing a business or person who has no
industrial connection with the original labor dispute. Such picket-
ing may be described as an instance of "secondary picketing"
which is not constitutionally protected from injunction. It is to
be borne in mind that, under recent Supreme Court doctrine,
secondary picketing is practiced as an exercise of free speech
where it is directed against a person or business closely related
and industrially connected with the original dispute.
Borden Co. v. Local No. 133 of International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen, and Helpers of America' was
decided while the Ritter case was in process of appeal to the U. S.
Supreme Court. The decision presents an interesting problem as
23 Id. at 726.
24 Where a state wishes to impose a restraint of freedom of expression taking the form
of peaceful picketing, the grounds for the restraint should be relatively specific, rather
than broad and general in character, in order to survive the constitutional objection.
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 1088 (1940). The right to picket peacefully is not lim-
ited to the case of an immediate or direct dispute between an employer and his employees.
American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941). The non-existence of a
"labor dispute" as defined by a state statute is not determinative of the right to picket
where the constitutional guaranty of free speech is asserted. Bakery and Pastry Drivers
and Helpers Local No. 802 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Wohl, 315
U. S. 769 (1942).
25 152 S. W. (2d) 828 (Tem. Civ. App. 1941).
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to whether the constitutional guaranty of free speech was given
effect. A labor dispute existed between the Borden Company and
its employees. Defendant union picketed retail stores selling Bor-
den's products, including the retail establishment of one Sam
Person. Both the Borden Co. and Person sought injunctions. The
trial court granted Person's application but denied that of the
Borden Co. because of a lack of definiteness in the application,
and the judgment was affirmed on appeal.
Person contended that the defendant union had no real dispute
with him, that its acts were intended to coerce him into discon-
tinuing the sale of a product for which there was a consumer de-
mand and that inducement of the public to refrain from purchas-
ing such product amounted to an illegal trust and conspiracy in
restraint of trade and an unlawful secondary boycott. The court
sustained these contentions, citing the anti-trust statutes, and con-
struing Arts. 5152-5154 as legalizing picketing only by striking
employees who seek to persuade other employees to quit or dis-
suade third persons from accepting employment. The court held
that although defendant's picketing involved no violence, the pur-
pose was to force the plaintiff "to discontinue the sale of milk
processed by the Borden Company, an act in direct violation of
the anti-trust laws of the state." The court further said:
"The courts of this state are vested with the authority, in protecting
the rights of citizens, to enjoin picketing by a labor organization where
no labor dispute does or can exist between the labor organization and
the person whose place of business is picketed. and where such picketing
involves such illegal conduct on the part of the defendant union as the
state is authorized to and has declared unlawful, or where such picket-
ing involves the violation of a law the constitutionality of which has
been sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States."26
One may argue that in the Borden case there was no substantial
"industrial connection" betwen Person's general retail establish-
ment and the dispute between the defendant union and the Borden
Company. If the argument is accepted, the case is consistent with
26 Id. at 834.
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the Ritter decision. But one may wonder if the connection was
not a good deal closer than that which appeared in the Ritter case.
It is difficult to evaluate Hotel and Restaurant Employees' In-
ternational Alliance and Bartenders' International League of
America v. Longley"7 because the fact situation is not fully re-
ported. Apparently, however, the situation involved a strike and
picketing by the plaintiff's employees in order to carry out the
intention of some unnamed third party to coerce the plaintiff into
signing a contract. The court, for procedural reasons, considered
all disputed fact questions involved in favor of the plaintiff and
assumed that there was no bona fide labor dispute between the
plaintiff and his employees. Hence, the picketing was not done
under any right granted by Art. 5153, but was an unlawful boy-
cott to coerce the signing of a contract. The court said:
"There is, in our opinion, no lawful power, legislative, executive, orjudicial, in this state or in this nation, to authorize picketing of a man's
place of business as a part of the means of effecting a boycott designed to
coerce the owner into signing a contract he otherwise would not sign." 2 8
The case does not refer directly to the state anti-trust laws,
but the court's designation of the defendant's acts as amounting
to a boycott seems to imply that those laws were violated, because
boycotts and other impediments to the natural course of trade are
among the primary evils proscribed by the anti-trust laws. It is
difficult to construct a case in which, despite the existence
of a strike and picketing by employees, no bona fide labor dis-
pute existed. If the non-existence of a bona fide labor dispute is
accepted, however, the case possibly may be supportable under
recent Supreme Court doctrine if there was no industrial connec-
tion between the original dispute and the later occurring strike
and picketing.
A very recent application of the anti-trust laws to labor activi-
ties occurred in Turner v. Zanes. 9 Plaintiff freight agency refused
27 160 S. W. (2d) 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
ts Id. at 127.
29 206 S. W. (2d) 144 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
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to enter into a closed shop contract, and defendant union took
steps to erforce a secondary boycott. The plaintiff's customers
were advised that their employees would strike and that picketing
would follow if they continued to do business with the plaintiff.
The court permitted a picket line to remain at the plaintiff's place
of business, but injunction was granted against the boyoctt and
picketing of customers with whom the plaintiff had contracts or
did business. The court stated:
"The foregoing facts conclusively establish a conspiracy in restraint
of trade or secondary boycott; such activities on the part of a labor
organization being violative of Texas statutes defining trusts, conspira-
cies against trade, pools and monopolies, as our courts have consistently
held from an early date." 30
It was pointed out that "peaceful picketing" for a proper labor
objective implies the absence of acts unlawful under statute as
well as of violence and trespass and that the constitutional guar-
anty of free speech does not preclude reasonable regulation.
The foregoing cases clearly demonstrate that the anti-trust
statutes of Texas are applicable to labor unions, and there is little
basis for the thought, which has had some currency, that labor
unions are exempt from the operation of these laws. 1 In the past
year the Texas Legislature has enacted amendments to the anti-
trust laws which put beyond question their application to labor
unions. -
There remains the difficult problem of determining when a
labor union goes beyond the rights and privileges afforded it
under state laws and under the Federal Constitution. Peaceful
30 Id. at 149.
31 It is interesting to note that Texas is regarded as being the most vigorous of all the
states in the enforcement of its anti-trust laws. 1 MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, 56 (1940).
s Tex. Laws 1947, c. 309. "The fact that trade unions, labor unions, and other organ-
izations, persons, and associations of persons have formed 'Trusts' and 'Conspiracies i2
Restraint of Trade' and have used economic power to restrain free trade and commerce,
contrary to the intent and purposes of the anti-trust laws of the State of Texas, while
claiming exemption from such laws, making it necessary that such statutes be amended
so as to clearly prohibit all trusts and conspiracies in restraint of trade, creates an emer-
gency.. ," etc.
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exercise of a union's most basic rights, striking and picketing,
causes some restraint of trade and commerce and results in
pecuniary loss. Nevertheless, exercise of these rights is not in.
variably a violation of the anti-trust laws, nor could it be so held,
if the constitutional guaranty of free speech is to be given effect.
Perhaps the cases mean that when a union has a dispute with its
employer and uses the traditional means of economic pressure,
striking and primary picketing, no violation of the anti-trust laws
is involved." But secondary boycotts and interference with third
parties who deal with the original employer disputant seem to
be violations of the statutes, particularly if the third parties have
no industrial connection with the dispute. Perhaps, too, the picket-
ing without strike situation, involving an outside union, is re-
garded as an unreasonable restraint of trade and commerce and
within the ban of anti-trust legislation.
It has been said that anti-trust legislation has been applied to
labor activity in Texas more stringently than elsewhere. The
statutes are broad in language and the exceptions cautious, and
no person or group should be able to claim itself above laws of
a general application. It is to be emphasized, however, that the
possibility exists that relief from literal application of the anti-
trust statutes may be obtained by assertion of the constitutional
right of free speech.
Milton P. Garner.
83 For cases wherein the picketing was held proper and not violative of the anti-trust
laws, see San Angelo v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butchers Workmen of North
America, Local 103, 139 S. W. (2d) 843 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) ; Tipton v. Hotel and Res-
taurant Employees International Alliance, Local No. 808, 149 S. W. (2d) 1028 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941) ; and The Fair, Inc. v. Retail Clerks International Protective Assn., Local No.
131,157 S. W. (2d) 176 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
[Vol. 2
